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Do Sexually Violent Predator Laws 
Violate Double Jeopardy or Substantive 
Due Process? 
AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY 
Tamara Rice Lave & Justin McCrary† 
Where the State has “disavowed any punitive intent”; limited 
confinement to a small segment of particularly dangerous 
individuals . . . and permitted immediate release upon a showing that 
the individual is no longer dangerous or mentally impaired, we cannot 
say that it acted with punitive intent.  
Kansas v. Hendricks, 19971 
It is the lack of an empirical footing that is and has always been the 
Achilles heel of constitutional law, not the lack of a good 
constitutional theory. 
Chief Judge Richard A. Posner, 19982 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1997, the Supreme Court held that the sexually 
violent predator (SVP) act in Kansas did not violate double 
  
 † Tamara Rice Lave, Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. 
Ph.D., Jurisprudence and Social Policy, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., Stanford 
Law School; B.A., Haverford College. Justin McCrary, Professor, University of California, 
Berkeley, School of Law. Ph.D., Economics, University of California, Berkeley; B.A., 
Princeton University. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Olin 
Conference on Law and Economics of Criminal Law at the University of Virginia in 
March 2010. A more recent version was presented at the Conference of Empirical Legal 
Studies at Northwestern University in November 2011. Co-authorship of this article was 
facilitated by the Center for Law and Society at the University of California, Berkeley 
where Tamara was a visiting scholar in the summer of 2011 and 2012. We would 
particularly like to thank the following individuals for their insightful comments and 
criticisms: David Abrams, Kathy Barnes, Joshua Fischman, Michael Froomkin, Dan Ho, 
Brandon Garnett, Richard Hynes, John Klick, J.J. Prescott, David Sklansky, Jordan 
Steiker, Bob Weisberg, and Frank Zimring. 
 1 521 U.S. 346, 368-69 (1997) (holding that the Kansas sexually violent 
predator law did not violate the U.S. Constitution). 
 2 Richard A. Posner, Madison Lecture: Against Constitutional Theory, 73 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21 (1998). 
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jeopardy or substantive due process even though it indefinitely 
commits an individual to a locked state-run facility after that 
individual has completed a maximum prison term. In this article, 
we question a core empirical foundation for the Court’s holding in 
Hendricks: that SVPs are so dangerous that they will commit 
repeat acts of sexual violence if they are not confined. Our 
findings suggest that SVP laws have had no discernible impact on 
the incidence of sex crimes. These results challenge the only 
constitutionally permissible justification for SVP legislation, and 
they imply that states could more effectively reduce sex crimes by 
allocating these resources elsewhere. Our argument merits 
particular attention because we are not asking the Court to 
reconsider evidence previously presented but deemed insufficient; 
instead, we are urging the Court to consider evidence that was 
not yet available when Hendricks was decided.  
The majority began its analysis in Kansas v. Hendricks by 
noting that in narrow circumstances, “an individual’s 
constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint 
may be overridden even in the civil context.”3 To justify such a 
commitment, the state must prove that the individual is dangerous 
and suffers from mental illness or a mental abnormality:  
A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a 
sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary 
commitment . . . [C]ivil commitment statutes [have been sustained] 
when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of 
some additional factor, such as a “mental illness” or “mental 
abnormality.” These added statutory requirements serve to limit 
involuntary civil commitment to those who suffer from a volitional 
impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control.4 
The SVP act in Kansas met both of these requirements.5 
Currently twenty states6 and the federal government 
have laws calling for the involuntary civil commitment of SVPs. 
  
 3 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356.  
 4 Id. at 358 (citations omitted). 
 5 The Kansas SVP Act requires the state to prove that a person (1) has been 
convicted of, or charged with, a sexually violent offense, and (2) suffers from a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder that makes it likely he will commit a future 
sexually violent offense. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a02 (West 2012).  
 6 Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North 
Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
For a detailed discussion of each of these statutes including date of passage and 
procedural protections, see Tamara Rice Lave, Throwing away the Key: Has the Adam 
Walsh Act Lowered the Threshold for Sexually Violent Predator Commitments Too Far?, 
14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 391, 409 (2011). 
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As of the summer of 2008, at least 4446 individuals were confined 
nationwide pursuant to SVP laws.7 Two years earlier, the total 
civil commitment budget across the country equaled $454.7 
million, with states spending an average of $94,017 per year on 
each committed SVP.8 
SVP laws allow the state to use civil law to lock people 
away in circumstances that constitute the functional equivalent of 
punishment. They are forced to reside in secure facilities with 
armed guards,9 are not free to leave and are subject to important 
limitations regarding diet, visitors, and activities. Most 
significantly, they have no idea when, or if, they will ever be 
released.10 Given that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments bar 
the state from punishing a person twice for the same crime and 
that SVP laws are designed to specifically target individuals who 
have served their maximum prison sentence, the classification of 
  
 7 This number was calculated using data that we received directly from 
seventeen states. For the three states that did not provide us data (Florida, Nebraska, 
and Pennsylvania) and for the state that did not provide us complete data 
(Massachusetts), we used data that was published by the Washington State Institute 
for Public Policy. KATHY GOOKIN, COMPARISON OF STATE LAWS AUTHORIZING 
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS: 2006 UPDATE, REVISED 
1 (August 2007), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/pub.asp?docid=07-08-1101. That 
study reported that the number of persons held under SVP laws in 2006 totaled 4534. 
Because that data was collected in 2006, and since the laws are still in effect, we are 
assuming that these states have more committed SVP’s now than they did then. For 
instance, a recent article in the Star Tribune stated that there are currently 650 
persons committed under Minnesota’s SVP law, and one has just been granted release. 
Paul McEnroe, First Sex Offender from State Program is Granted Release, STAR TRIB., 
(Feb. 3, 2012, 11:32 PM), http://www.startribune.com/local/stpaul/138669904.html. For 
another article about sex offender commitments, see Monica Davey & Abby 
Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 
2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/us/04civil.html. 
 8 See GOOKIN, supra note 7, at 5.  
 9 See id. at 1; ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL 
VIOLENT PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 21-22 (2006); see 
also Brief for Leroy Hendricks, Cross Petitioner, at 19, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 
346 (1997) (No. 95-1649) (“Instead of receiving treatment in a therapeutic setting, 
respondent is incarcerated in a Department of Corrections facility, in a setting 
indistinguishable from his former convict status, and denied the privileges given to 
civilly committed inmates in Kansas.”). For a representative look at a treating 
hospital, see Cal. Dep’t of State Hosps., DSH—Coalinga: Security, CA.GOV, 
http://www.dsh.ca.gov/Coalinga/Security.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2013) (describing the 
“state-of-the-art security system” that surrounds the hospital and lists security 
measures such as random shakedowns, metal detectors, and uniforms of inmates. “[A]ll 
patients are constantly and directly supervised.”). 
 10 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363-64 (“Hendricks focuses on his confinement’s 
potentially indefinite duration as evidence of the State’s punitive intent. That focus, 
however, is misplaced. Far from any punitive objective, the confinement’s duration is 
instead linked to the stated purpose of the commitment, namely, to hold the person 
until his mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others.”); see also 
JANUS, supra note 9, at 22. 
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the law as civil or criminal is critical. If the SVP law were 
classified as criminal, it would constitute an impermissible second 
punishment.11 If the law is civil, however, the state may continue 
to hold these individuals because the prohibition on double 
jeopardy would not apply.12 
In Hendricks, the Court accepted the state’s classification 
of the law as civil in large part because the justices simply 
presumed as true the legislature’s empirical claim that SVPs are 
“extremely dangerous”13 and their “likelihood of engaging in 
repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is high.”14 The rationale 
for the law could not be deterrence, the Court reasoned, because it 
empirically assumed SVPs could not be deterred;15 nor could it be 
retributive, because the only purpose for introducing prior 
criminal history was to show the presence of a mental disorder or 
dangerousness. Even though the state’s civil commitment scheme 
involved indefinite confinement,16 the Court argued that the 
legislative findings justified such confinement because, “[f]ar from 
any punitive objective, the confinement’s duration is instead 
linked to the stated purposes of the commitment, namely, to hold 
the person until his mental abnormality no longer causes him to 
be a threat to others.”17  
  
 11 In Ex parte Lange, the Court explained the principle behind double jeopardy: 
If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it is 
that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same offence. 
And . . . there has never been any doubt of its entire and complete protection 
of the party when a second punishment is proposed in the same court, on the 
same facts, for the same statutory offence. 
Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168 (1873). 
 12 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369 (discussing Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 
(1966), in which the Court “expressly recognized that civil commitment could follow the 
expiration of a prison term without offending double jeopardy principles.”). 
 13 Id. at 351. 
 14 Id. 
 15 The Court explained why the legislature could not have intended that the 
Act deter SVPs: 
Nor can it be said that the legislature intended the Act to function as a 
deterrent. Those persons committed under the Act are, by definition, 
suffering from a “mental abnormality” or a “personality disorder” that 
prevents them from exercising adequate control over their behavior. Such 
persons are therefore unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement.  
Id. at 362-63. 
 16 The Court used the term “affirmative restraint” because it is one of the factors 
from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), that is used to distinguish 
criminal from civil statutes. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 394 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 17 Id. at 363 (majority opinion). 
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Many have criticized the Court’s holding in Hendricks.18 
Eli Rollman argues that several factors show that the law should 
be considered criminal, including “the fact that implementation of 
the Act is delayed until the ‘anticipated release’ of a prisoner, 
thereby lessening the effect of any treatment while 
simultaneously maximizing punishment.”19 Andrew Campbell 
criticizes the majority for allowing the states to “[m]erely redefine 
any measure which is claimed to be punishment as ‘regulation,’ 
and, magically, the Constitution no longer prohibits its 
imposition.”20 Others have focused their attention on the nebulous 
quality of a “mental abnormality.”21 The American Psychiatric 
Association created a taskforce to evaluate SVP laws and 
concluded that, “sexual predator commitment laws represent a 
serious assault on the integrity of psychiatry, particularly with 
regard to defining mental illness and the clinical conditions for 
compulsory treatment.”22 Still another line of critique focuses on 
the use of actuarial instruments to prove dangerousness. Bernard 
Harcourt criticizes the actuarial nature of SVP laws for treating 
offenders as objects,23 while Richard Wollert24 and Tamara Lave25 
contend that we simply do not have the ability to accurately 
predict future dangerousness, which means that these states are 
locking away people who would not reoffend if released.  
  
 18 For a general critique of sexually violent predator laws, see JANUS, supra note 
9, at 36-38 (arguing that SVP laws undermine the Constitution’s due process protections by 
inappropriately blurring the line between punishment and civil commitment). 
 19 Eli M. Rollman, Supreme Court Review, “Mental Illness”: A Sexually Violent 
Predator is Punished Twice for One Crime, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1013 (1998). 
 20 Andrew D. Campbell, Note, Kansas v. Hendricks: Absent a Clear Meaning 
of Punishment, States Are Permitted to Violate Double Jeopardy Clause, 30 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 87, 87 (1998) (quoting Justice Marshall dissenting in United States v. Salerno, 481 
U.S. 739, 760 (1987)).  
 21 See Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger, Flight from Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 250, 261 (1998) (arguing that the term “mental abnormality” is 
“circularly defined . . . collap[sing] all badness into madness”); Bruce J. Winick, Sex 
Offender Law in the 1990s: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 505, 525-30 (1998) (arguing that the definition of mental abnormality is so 
broad that it can apply to any behavior). 
 22 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS: A TASK FORCE 
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 173 (1999). 
 23 BERNARD E. HARCOURT AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND 
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007) (also contending that the SVP laws are 
radically inefficient by focusing resources on rare events).  
 24 Richard Wollert, Low Base Rates Limit Expert Certainty When Current 
Actuarials Are Used to Identify Sexually Violent Predators: An Application of Bayes’s 
Theorem, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 56 (2006). 
 25 Tamara Rice Lave, Controlling Sexually Violent Predators: Continued 
Incarceration at What Cost?, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 213 (2011).  
1396 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:4 
In this article, we expand on these criticisms in a new and 
important way. We question whether SVPs are “extremely 
dangerous” and thus highly likely to commit violent sex crimes if 
released. In our analysis, we use original data gathered directly 
from SVP states to review commitments across the country. Next, 
using panel data for the last few decades, we examine the impact of 
SVP laws on the incidence of sex-related homicide and forcible 
rape. We also use data collected in the National Child Abuse and 
Neglect Data System (NCANDS) to examine the impact of SVP 
legislation on the incidence of non-fatal child sexual abuse.26 
Finally, since underreporting poses problems in accurately 
measuring the incidence of sex crimes, we also examine gonorrhea 
rates, a common proxy for the prevalence of sexual abuse. 
We found that SVP laws have had no discernible impact 
on the incidence of sex crimes or gonorrhea—a result that carries 
enormous constitutional significance.27 If the state cannot justify 
its law on incapacitation grounds, then it must offer another 
reason for locking these individuals away indefinitely—under the 
constraints imposed by the Constitution. The state may not 
continue to hold persons in custody who have served their 
  
 26 See Nat’l Data Archive on Child Abuse & Neglect, National Child Abuse and 
Neglect Data System (NCANDS), Detailed Case Data Component (DCDC), NDACAN, 
http://www.ndacan.cornell.edu/ndacan/Datasets/Abstracts/DatasetAbstract_NCANDS_Gen
eral.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2013) [hereinafter NCANDS Data].  
 27 At first glance, it may appear that our methodology is ruled out by 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), where the Court held that even if a large 
scientific study showed the death penalty had a racially discriminatory impact, a 
petitioner must still show that the discrimination was purposeful. Unlike in McCleskey, 
however, we are not using statistics to make an equal protection argument but instead 
to examine whether SVP law is civil or criminal. If the state cannot justify SVP law on 
non-punitive grounds, then it must be struck down as a violation of double jeopardy. In 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), the Supreme Court reversed Green’s 
conviction for first degree murder on the grounds that it constituted double jeopardy. 
Justice Black explained why the framers considered double jeopardy such a serious 
infringement of a person’s rights:  
The constitutional prohibition against “double jeopardy” was designed to 
protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible 
conviction more than once for an alleged offense. . .The underlying idea, one 
that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of 
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be 
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged 
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and 
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well 
as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found 
guilty.  
355 U.S. 184, 187-88. Therefore it does not make sense to argue that individual SVPs 
must make a showing particular to their case, because if the law is not constitutional, 
then the state is barred from trying to commit anyone under it in the first place.  
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maximum prison sentence under a justification that they deserve 
additional custody to pay for their crimes. Nor may the state lock 
up persons as SVPs to deter would-be offenders. Both these 
reasons are punitive, and they violate double jeopardy. 
Furthermore, because SVP laws infringe on a 
fundamental liberty interest, they are subject to heightened 
scrutiny under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.28 The 
Court has consistently held that, to meet the demands of 
substantive due process, a civil commitment law must only apply 
to individuals who are mentally ill and dangerous.29 Our findings 
show that SVP laws are not so narrowly tailored.  
We believe that our contribution is methodological, 
substantive, and theoretical. Too often in the debate over sex 
offender policy, politicians and judges make empirical claims 
about sex offenders without ever questioning the veracity of those 
claims.30 We hope that by challenging some of those empirical 
claims, we will influence more policy makers to do the same. 
Secondly, these laws are expressly premised on the claim that 
SVPs currently suffer from mental illness, which causes them to 
have “serious difficulty in controlling behavior,” thus making 
them distinguishable “from the dangerous but typical recidivist.”31 
Yet we show that the best available evidence of those in SVP 
custody suggests that these individuals are not in fact 
distinguishable from the “dangerous but typical recidivist,” which 
is pivotal to the distinction between civil and criminal laws. 
Finally, there is a robust debate in legal academia regarding the 
extent to which courts should defer to legislative findings.32 We 
  
 28 “Freedom from physical restraint being a fundamental right, the State 
must have a particularly convincing reason, which it has not put forward, for such 
discrimination against insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill.” Foucha v. 
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992).  
 29 “A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient 
ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment. We have sustained 
civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the 
proof of some additional factor, such as a ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’” 
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (internal citations omitted); see also 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (holding that to civilly commit someone to a 
mental institution, the state is required by the Due Process Clause to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that the person is mentally ill and requires hospitalization for 
“his own welfare and protection of others”). 
 30 See generally Tamara Rice Lave, Inevitable Recidivism: The Birth and 
Centrality of an Urban Legend, 34 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 186, 187-88 (2011).  
 31 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002). 
 32 See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative 
Fact-Finding, 84 IND. L.J. 1 (2009) (arguing that legislatures are poorly suited for 
gathering and evaluating facts impartially, especially when considering legislation 
restricting controversial or minority rights and thus advocating that courts should 
 
1398 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:4 
hope that our article will lend support to the importance of 
independent fact-finding, especially when fundamental rights of 
unpopular groups are at stake.  
Our article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we discuss the 
theory explaining why SVP laws should have an impact on sex 
crimes. In Part II, we introduce the original data that we 
gathered to conduct part of our analysis. In Part III, we evaluate 
whether SVP laws have resulted in increased commitments, and 
in Part IV we analyze whether they have had an impact on the 
incidence of sexual homicide, forcible rape, child sexual abuse, 
and/or gonorrhea. In Part V, we suggest that our findings are 
not surprising in light of the literature on aging and 
dangerousness. Part VI briefly explores whether our results are 
due at least in part to the state’s inability to accurately predict 
who will re-offend, and Part VII is devoted to considering 
whether the state might more effectively fight sex crimes by 
directing resources elsewhere. Finally, Part VIII discusses the 
constitutional implications for our findings. 
I. THEORY: WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF SVP LAW FOR 
THE RATE OF SEX CRIMES? 
SVP laws are explicitly premised on the notion that there 
is a small, readily identifiable segment of the population that is 
so dangerous that public safety demands they be locked away.33 
If this claim were true then we would expect to see what 
criminologists term an “incapacitation effect”—in other words, 
removing these dangerous people from the community should 
discernibly reduce the rate of crimes that they are at risk of 
  
independently review the factual foundation of legislation that curtails basic individual 
rights, regardless of whether those rights are subject to heightened scrutiny); Ruth 
Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001) (criticizing 
the Rehnquist Court for using its authority to diminish the proper role of Congress, 
including by “transforming what had been considered proper factual questions within 
Congress’s purview into legal questions for the Court’s exclusive determination” and 
thus “displacing Congress’s proper factfinding role”); John O. McGinnis & Charles W. 
Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law: The Courts Versus Congress in Social Fact-Finding, 
25 CONST. COMMENT. 69 (2008) (advocating for “independent judicial evaluation of 
facts necessary” for assessing the constitutionality of legislation). 
 33 “The bill is narrowly tailored to focus on the smaller number of habitual 
sex offenders who, because of their psychological makeup, pose an immediate danger to 
the public as soon as they are released from prison.” In re Care & Treatment of 
Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 140 (Kan. 1996) (Larson, J., dissenting) (quoting testimony of 
State Senator Bob Vancrum before Kansas Senate Judiciary Committee on Feb. 22, 
1994) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d sub. nom. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. 346 (1997).  
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committing.34 Specifically, we would expect to see a noticeable 
decrease in the rate of sexual homicide, forcible rape, and child 
sexual abuse. 
Of course, it is also possible that SVP laws have an 
impact on the incidence of certain crimes because they deter 
would-be sex offenders from violating the law. A deterrence 
theory is modeled on a rational choice view, which assumes that 
if the costs of violating a law are high enough, a person will 
choose not to offend.35 This would be the case if a would-be sex 
offender decided not to violate the law because he did not want 
to risk lifetime commitment as a SVP.  
Extensive literature exists on the impact of law on crime,36 
and such studies have played an important role in the debate over 
the death penalty. Some scholars contend that the death penalty 
saves lives,37 but others find no significant evidence of deterrence.38 
  
 34 For a general discussion of incapacitation and deterrence, see Daniel S. 
Nagin, Deterrence and Incapacitation, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 
345-68 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998). 
 35 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 162 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1996) (1651) (arguing that the purpose of punishment is to convince people to 
obey the law, “If the harm inflicted be lesse than the benefit, or contentment that 
naturally followeth the crime committed, that harm is not within the definition; and is 
rather the Price, or Redemption, than the Punishment of a Crime; Because it is of the 
nature of Punishment, to have for end, the disposing of men to obey the Law; which 
end (if it be lesse than the benefit of transgression) it attaineth not, but worketh a 
contrary effect”); CESARE BONESANA & MARCHESE BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND 
PUNISHMENTS (Edward D. Ingraham, trans., 1819) (arguing that “[t]he end of 
punishment, therefore, is no other than to prevent the criminal from doing further 
injury to society, and to prevent others from committing the like offence. Such 
punishments, therefore, and such a mode of inflicting them, ought to be chosen, as will 
make the strongest and most lasting impressions on the minds of others, with the least 
torment to the body of the criminal . . . . Crimes are more effectually prevented by the 
certainty than the severity of punishment . . . . That a punishment may produce the 
effect required, it is sufficient that the evil it occasions should exceed the good expected 
from the crime, including in the calculation the certainty of the punishment, and the 
privation of the expected advantage.”); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Macmillan 1948) (1789) (contending that the 
purpose of punishment is to dissuade wrongdoing: “the value of the punishment must 
not less in any case than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the 
offense.”). 
 36 See, e.g., FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL 
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME (1995) (exploring how useful the modern 
prison is in restraining crime and the effectiveness of incapacitation); Isaac Erlich, The 
Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1972) (an analytical 
and empirical examination of the extent of the deterrent effect of law enforcement).  
 37 See, e.g., Hashem Dezhbakhish et al., Does Capital Punishment Have 
Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 344 (2003) (arguing that each execution results on average in eighteen fewer 
murders); Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Matter of Life 
and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975) (arguing for the existence of the differential 
deterrent effect of capital punishment); Paul R. Zimmerman, State Executions, 
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In a 2005 article in the Stanford Law Review, John J. Donohue and 
Justin Wolfers tested the robustness of these studies, ultimately 
concluding that, “existing evidence for deterrence is surprisingly 
fragile.”39 Other scholars argue that the death penalty actually 
increases the murder rate.40 In 2012, however, the National 
Academy of Sciences published a report in which they found that 
there is insufficient evidence from the research conducted to date to 
show definitively whether the death penalty has an impact of any 
kind on the homicide rate.41  
Although we use many of the same methodologies to 
evaluate the impact of SVP legislation, our analysis contains a key 
difference as compared to the death penalty debate. Even if the 
death penalty does not deter murder, it may still be constitutional. 
A proponent of capital punishment could argue that the death 
penalty is justified because the offender deserves it; indeed, a 
retributivist would argue that deterrence is irrelevant to what 
punishment a person should receive.42 A proponent of SVP laws, in 
contrast, cannot ignore that the laws may have no incapacitation 
effect. Such a proponent would not be able to say that a SVP 
deserves to be locked away based on the severity of the SVP’s 
underlying conduct because that would be a punitive rationale, 
which would make the laws criminal and not civil. Deterrence is 
also a punitive rationale,43 which means that a proponent cannot 
  
Deterrence, and the Incidence of Murder, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 163 (2004) (arguing that a 
state execution deters approximately fourteen murders per year on average). 
 38 See, e.g., Lawrence Katz et al., Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and 
Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318 (2003) (arguing that there is little systematic 
evidence that the execution rate influences the crime rate). 
 39 John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence 
in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2005). 
 40 See, e.g., John K. Cochran & Mitchell B. Chamlin, Deterrence and 
Brutalization: The Dual Effects of Executions, 17 JUST. Q. 685 (2000) (finding an 
increase in the level of argument-based murders of strangers in the period following 
execution); Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization: Capital 
Punishment’s Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 203 (2005) (showing 
rate of murder increased in thirteen states following executions). 
 41 COMM. ON LAW & JUSTICE AT THE NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND 
THE DEATH PENALTY, REPORT BRIEF 2 (Daniel S. Nagin & John V. Pepper, eds. Apr. 2012), 
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/NatResCouncil-Deterr.pdf. 
 42 “Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote 
some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but instead it must in all 
cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has committed a crime . . . .” 
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 138 (John Ladd, trans., 
2d ed. 1999) (1797) (emphasis added). 
 43 “If the apparent magnitude, or rather value of that pain be greater than 
the apparent magnitude or value of the pleasure or good he expects to be the 
consequence of the act, he will be absolutely prevented from performing it.” Jeremy 
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justify SVP legislation under the theory that it dissuades other 
would-be sex offenders from violating the law. In a criminal 
law regime, the state may not imprison someone subsequent to 
serving the maximum jail sentence—as SVPs by definition 
have—because the additional time would constitute a second 
punishment for the same crime and thus violate the Fifth 
Amendment ban on double jeopardy.  
A. How Much of an Impact Should We Expect?  
Evaluating the impact of SVP laws on the incidence of 
forcible rape and sex-related homicide requires taking a stance on 
the counterfactual—what would have happened to rates of crime 
and sexual abuse in SVP states had these laws never been passed? 
Taking a stance is necessary because the estimated impact of the 
law is the gap between the observed prevalence of crime or sexual 
abuse and the prevalence shown in the counterfactual. In this 
context, approximating the counterfactual is complicated by two 
factors. First, most SVP laws were passed during a period of 
decreasing crime in the United States.44 Thus, it is easy for a 
simplistic analysis to conflate the effect of SVP passage on the 
incidence of crime and sexual abuse with secular trends in crime. 
Crime and disorder are lower after SVP passage than before, but 
this holds true for states that have not passed any SVP law. 
Second, states that passed SVP legislation are not necessarily 
comparable to states that did not. In particular, these two groups of 
states might have had rates of crime and sexual abuse that 
differed, even if no SVP law had been enacted. 
To address these difficulties, we focus on two research 
designs. The first of these is a difference-in-differences design 
that compares the incidence of crime, for example, between 
SVP and non-SVP states after passage, to create a benchmark 
for how different crime would have been had no SVP law ever 
been passed. The benchmark taken is the difference in the 
incidence of crime between SVP and non-SVP states before 
passage. The core assumption behind this method is that the 
difference between the counterfactual prevalence of crime in 
SVP states and observed prevalence of crime in non-SVP states 
  
Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 396 (John 
Bowring ed. 1843). 
 44 See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 
(2006) (documenting and discussing theories that explain the American crime decline 
of the 1990s). 
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does not change over time. Our second approach is a 
generalization of the difference-in-differences approach that 
takes advantage of the idiosyncratic timing of the year each 
state passed SVP legislation. This second approach supplements 
the use of non-SVP states as a control group by using the 
prevalence of crime in an SVP state prior to SVP passage. This 
method fully exploits the assumption of no anticipatory 
behavior, by which we mean that SVP laws should not affect 
the prevalence of crime until after date of passage.  
As is the case with many empirical examinations of the 
social impact of law, our results are subject to statistical 
imprecision. Overall, however, our estimates are consistent with 
SVP laws having no discernible deterrent or incapacitation effects.  
We use the existing literature to assess the statistical 
power delivered by this design. 
B. Does Underreporting Distort our Results?  
Many contend that the rate of underreporting in sex 
cases is high,45 which means that our results could be skewed 
downwards as a result. To get around this potential problem, 
we also analyze whether SVP laws have had an impact on the 
incidence of gonorrhea, as it is frequently used as a proxy for 
the incidence of sexual abuse. Sue Whaitiri and Patrick Kelly 
studied all children seen at an Auckland, New Zealand hospital 
since 1992 who had been diagnosed with genital gonorrhea. 
They found that at least forty percent of these children had 
gotten the disease through sexual abuse.46 Sten Vermund and 
others studied medical screening data collected on 2521 
adolescents at entry into juvenile detention facilities in New 
York City between 1983 and 1984, and they found that a 
  
 45 See, e.g., Jody Clay-Warner & Callie Harbin Burt, Rape Reporting After 
Reforms: Have Times Really Changed?, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 150 (2005); 
Bonnie S. Fisher et al., Reporting Sexual Victimization to the Police and Others: Results 
From a National-Level Study of College Women, 30 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 6, 7 (2003); 
Lita Furby et al., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 9 (1989); 
Mary P. Koss et al., The Scope of Rape: Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual Aggression 
and Victimization in a National Sample of Higher Education Students, 55 J. 
COUNSELING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL., 162-70 (1987); John J. Sloan III et al., Assessing 
the Student Right to Know and Campus Security Act of 1999: An Analysis of the Victim 
Reporting Practices of College and University Students, 43 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 148, 
158 (1997) (finding that only 22 percent of rape and 17 percent of sexual assaults were 
reported to local law enforcement, campus police or security or other authorities). For a 
critical discussion of underreporting in sex crimes, see Lave, supra note 25, at 221-24. 
 46 Sue Whaitiri & Patrick Kelly, Genital Gonorrhea in Children: Determining the 
Source and Mode of Infection, ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD, 96, 247-51 (2009). 
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history of sexual abuse was strongly correlated with gonorrhea 
or syphilis.47  
C.  How Much of an Impact Is Required for SVP Laws to be 
Constitutional?  
In Hendricks, the Supreme Court upheld SVP 
legislation under the theory that the state had the right to lock 
up persons who suffer from a mental disorder that causes them 
to be “extremely dangerous.”48 To assess whether this claim is 
true, however, we must have some way of quantifying what 
“extremely dangerous” means. In other words, how dangerous 
must a person be for the Constitution to allow the state to lock 
that person away?  
In Kansas v. Crane, the Court attempted to clarify the 
Hendricks standard for “mental abnormality” or “personality 
disorder,” which originally required that the disorder make it 
“difficult if not impossible for the person to control his 
behavior.”49 Michael Crane, a convicted sex offender, appealed 
his commitment as a SVP. The Kansas Supreme Court 
overturned the commitment because no finding had been made 
at trial that Crane was unable to control his dangerous 
behavior, as required under the U.S. Constitution by 
Hendricks.50 The state of Kansas appealed, arguing that the 
Kansas Supreme Court had interpreted the holding in 
Hendricks too restrictively.51 In a 7-2 decision, the Court agreed 
and vacated the Kansas Supreme Court’s judgment.52  
Even though the Hendricks opinion had specifically 
described the Kansas law as being akin to laws that provided 
for the “forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to 
control their behavior,”53 the Court now held that the state did 
  
 47 Sten H. Vermund et al., History of Sexual Abuse in Incarcerated 
Adolescents with Gonorrhea or Syphilis, 11 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 449 (1990); 
see also Stephen C. Boos, Abuse Detection and Screening, in CHILD ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT, GUIDELINES FOR IDENTIFICATION, ASSESSMENT, AND CASE MANAGEMENT 10 
(Marilyn Strachan Peterson & Michael Durfee eds. 2003) (“[D]iseases such as 
gonorrhea, syphilis, chlamydia, genital herpes and genital warts usually have the same 
implication in children as in adults. Sexually transmitted diseases require an 
evaluation for sexual abuse.”); Kristen Alexander et al., Interviewing Children, in 
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra. 
 48 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 351 (1997). 
 49 Id. at 358 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-20a02(b) (1994)). 
 50 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002). 
 51 Id. at 409. 
 52 Id. at 415.  
 53 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357 (emphasis added). 
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not need to prove an inability to control.54 Yet the Court did not 
adopt Kansas’s position that a person could be committed as a 
SVP “without any lack of control determination.”55 Instead, it 
held that the standard was “proof of serious difficulty in 
controlling behavior.”56 The Court noted that a large population 
of the prison population is mentally ill.57 To ensure that the 
confinement remains civil and not criminal, the Court stated 
that the SVP must be distinguishable from other sex offenders: 
“The severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be 
sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose 
serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to 
civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist 
convicted in an ordinary criminal case.”58 
The holdings in Hendricks and Crane highlight the 
constitutional significance of our analysis. According to 
Hendricks, the only legally permissible justification for SVP 
laws is that SVPs suffer from mental illness, which makes 
them so dangerous that they need to be incapacitated. It would, 
however, constitute double jeopardy to send them to a locked 
mental hospital to make them pay for having committed 
reprehensible crimes or to discourage others from committing 
similar crimes. Crane establishes how dangerous these 
offenders must be in order for the SVP law to withstand 
heightened substantive due process scrutiny. Their inability to 
control must be sufficient to distinguish them from the 
“dangerous but typical recidivist.” Thus, if our analysis shows 
that SVP laws have had little influence on the rate of sex-
related homicide, forcible rape, or child sexual abuse, then 
there is reason to call into question the only constitutionally 
permissible rationale for the laws. 
II. DATA  
To conduct these analyses, we gathered data from states 
on SVP commitments. We also gathered data from national 
crime databases on the incidence of forcible rape and sexual 
homicide.59 For data on child sexual abuse, we turned to records 
  
 54 Crane, 534 U.S. at 411. 
 55 Id. at 412. 
 56 Id. at 413. 
 57 Id. at 412. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See infra notes 69-70. 
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collected in the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System 
(NCANDS).60 Our gonorrhea data came from the Center for 
Disease Control.61 The purpose of this section is mostly 
descriptive, however, we also analyze whether SVP laws have 
actually resulted in increased commitments or whether they 
are purely symbolic. We find that SVP passage has had a 
strong effect on rates of commitment. 
A. Commitment Data from the States 
On August 12, 2008, one of the authors, Lave, wrote to 
the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers and 
requested data on SVP commitments. The Association was 
unable to provide information, however, they did give contact 
information for each SVP state. Lave then wrote to each state 
and requested information on SVP commitments. Each state 
required more than one contact to provide information, and 
typically, there were several email exchanges and often a 
phone conversation. Some states required requests in writing, 
and California mandated a formal FOIA request. 
We received commitment data by year from sixteen of 
the twenty SVP states: Arizona, California, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
North Dakota, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington and 
Wisconsin. Because Massachusetts only provided one year’s worth 
of data, for 2009, we supplemented the data using the number of 
commitments (121) reported by the Washington State Institute 
for Public Policy.62 Overall, we received information on the date of 
commitment for close to 1000 individuals. 
It should be noted that the total number of 
commitments reported by each of these sixteen states differed 
from the total number of commitments reported by the 
Washington State Institute for Public Policy.63 Since we did not 
have access to the underlying data used by Washington State, it 
is unclear whether the inconsistency is due in part to differing 
definitions of “committed”—whether it is people who are 
pending commitment hearings or only those who have already 
  
 60 See infra note 71. 
 61 See infra note 72. 
 62 See GOOKIN, supra note 7, at exhibit 1. 
 63 For instance, Gookin reported that, as of 2006, there were 305 commitments in 
Washington State, 161 in Kansas, 342 in Minnesota, 500 in Wisconsin, 414 in Arizona, 558 
in California, 307 in Illinois, 75 in North Dakota, 69 in Iowa, 342 in New Jersey, 119 in 
South Carolina, 143 in Missouri, 69 in Texas, and 37 in Virginia. Id. at 3-4.  
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been formally adjudicated to be SVPs. As will be explained in 
more detail below, this inconsistency in the number of 
commitments does not impact the validity of our results.  
In addition, we received age data from thirteen states. 
For eleven of these states (Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, 
Missouri, New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, 
Washington, and Wisconsin), we were able to calculate the 
age of commitment and the current age for each SVP. Two 
states, Minnesota and North Dakota, provided the age range 
of those committed. 
Despite repeated requests, we did not receive any data 
from Florida, Nebraska, or Pennsylvania. According to a 2007 
report from the Washington State Institute for Public Policy, 
these states did commit individuals as SVPs.64 As of 2006, 
Florida had 942 SVP commitments, while Nebraska had 
eighteen and Pennsylvania had twelve.65  
Table 166 shows the passage date for each SVP law, the 
nature of commitment in each state, and the number of people 
committed and released based on the data that we received. Unless 
otherwise specified, that date is August 2008. As indicated above, 
we were unable to gather commitment information from Florida, 
Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania, and so that 
information comes from the Washington State Institute for Public 
Policy.67 Where available, we also include information on the 2006 
civil commitment budget for each state, which comes from the 
same Washington State report.68  
B. Crime and Gonorrhea Data 
We gathered our crime data from two primary, publicly-
available sources. The forcible rape data is provided by a 
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigations, 
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) website.69 The sex homicide data 
comes from the UCR Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) 
available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political 
  
 64 Id. at exhibit 1. 
 65 Id. at 3.  
 66 Table 1 can be found in the appendix at the end of this article.  
 67 Id. 
 68 Id.  
 69 Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, 
UCRDATATOOL.GOV, www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/Crime.cfm (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).  
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and Social Research (ICPSR) website.70 Since there is no special 
classification for “sex related homicide” in the SHR, we 
combined three types of homicides to create the sex-related 
homicide category: rape, other sex offenses, and prostitution or 
vice. For both forcible rape and sex-related homicide, we used 
data from 1976 to 2009. 
Although child sexual abuse is not a UCR specified 
crime, data is available from the National Child Abuse and 
Neglect Data System (NCANDS).71 We use data from the 
NCANDS for 1990 through 2008. NCANDS does not contain 
criminal records, but instead contains data collected by the 
Department of Health and Human Services.  
The data on gonorrhea is from the Center for Disease 
Control.72 In conducting our analyses, we used data from 1984 
to 2008. 
III. DID SVP LEGISLATION ACTUALLY RESULT IN INCREASED 
COMMITMENTS?  
Before we analyze whether SVP laws have had an effect 
on the incidence of sex crimes, we must first establish that people 
have actually been committed pursuant to these laws. To do that, 
as explained above, we gathered data from SVP states regarding 
the number of commitments per year under the program. 
We then ran a regression of commitments in a given 
state and year on a series of dummy variables for the states, for 
the years, and dummy variables corresponding to the leads and 
lags of SVP passage date. More details on the regression 
specification and the definition of the dummies are given in 
Part V, below. The coefficients from this regression are 
displayed in the figures below. The x-axis corresponds to years 
since SVP passage; hence zero is the year of SVP passage. The 
y-axis gives the number of commitments, relative to the 
number of commitments in year of SVP passage.  
  
 70 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM DATA: 
SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORTS (2009), available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/ 
icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/30767?q=supplementary+homicide+reports&permit%5B0%5D= 
AVAILABLE. 
 71 The Children’s Bureau at the Department of Health and Human Services 
collects child abuse and neglect data from the states. It requests data from Child and 
Protective Services. The data is supplied voluntarily. See NCANDS Data, supra note 26. 
 72 Sexually Transmitted Disease Morbidity, 1984–2008 Archive Request, CDC 
WONDER, http://wonder.cdc.gov/std-v2008.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2013). 
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Figure 1 shows convincingly that SVP passage had a 
strong effect on commitments, with roughly fifteen to twenty 
new commitments per year in the years following passage. This 
is either a low or a high number, depending on notions of the 
latent criminality of those committed. This figure is similar in 
organization to a variety of such figures we present below, so it 
is worth describing this figure in some detail. The open circles 
correspond to estimates of the effect of SVP passage on the 
outcome—here, SVP commitments—leading up to and 
subsequent to SVP passage. The dashed lines convey the scope 
of uncertainty surrounding these estimates because we have a 
sample of information, rather than the universe of possible 
information. These are standard in the empirical legal studies 
literature. The figure shows that the estimates leading up to 
SVP passage should be approximately zero if the timing of SVP 
passage is essentially random. A trend in the pre-passage 
estimates would be consistent with trends in the outcome 
predicting the date of SVP passage, which is inconsistent with 
the maintained assumption that the timing of SVP passage is 
random. Here, there is little indication of SVP commitments 
prior to SVP passage—that is, the pre-passage estimates are 
essentially zero. This indicates the robustness of our 
methodology, since the technique should not estimate any 
effect of SVP passage on commitments prior to SVP passage. 
The post-passage estimates represent our best guess regarding 
the effect of SVP passage on the cumulative annual increase in 
SVP commitments in a typical state. SVP commitments 
increased roughly linearly in time, suggesting that there is a 
constant rate of inflow into SVP confinement.  
We return to methodological detail below and for now focus 
on the substantive interpretation of the estimated effects of SVP 
passage on commitments. Regarding the level, our data likely 
underestimates the number of commitments, since the data was 
directly provided by states. Some states were unwilling to provide 
information, leading us to undercount the scope of SVP programs 
nationally. External estimates tend to find much higher numbers 
of commitments nationally, with less detail than is shown in our 
data.73 These differences can be explained by a few factors. First, 
the number of commitments has been growing since we collected 
our data, and we do not adjust our numbers to reflect these 
increases. In addition, we did not receive data from all SVP states, 
  
 73 See GOOKIN, supra note 7.  
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and so we were forced to rely on data from alternative sources. 
Because we segregate our analysis of confinement patterns from 
our analysis of the impact of SVP passage on other outcomes, any 
errors in the number of confinements do not affect our analyses of 
crime and sexual abuse.  
 
IV. DID SVP LEGISLATION HAVE AN INCAPACITATION 
EFFECT?  
Although scholars recognize the importance of evaluating 
whether SVP laws have had an impact on the incidence of sex 
crimes, we are aware of no one who has done such an analysis.74 
In this paper, we used recognized statistical techniques to 
evaluate the impact of SVP laws on the incidence of sex crimes: a 
difference-in-differences analysis and a panel data technique.  
A. Difference-in-Differences Analysis 
First, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis of 
the effect of SVP passage on the rate of sex-related homicide, 
forcible rape, and child sexual abuse. This approach examines 
the difference in an outcome, on average, between SVP and 
non-SVP states after SVP passage and measures that 
difference against the benchmark of the analogous difference 
between SVP and non-SVP states before SVP passage. The 
  
 74 See Jill S. Levenson & David D’Amora, Social Policies Designed to Prevent 
Sexual Violence: The Emperor’s New Clothes?, 18 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 168, 184 (2007). 
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hope is that any differences between SVP and non-SVP states 
in the incidence of the outcome that would be observed in the 
absence of SVP passage are the same over time. Under that 
assumption, the benchmark pre-passage difference between 
SVP and non-SVP states measures the counterfactual 
difference in outcomes after SVP passage, as if the SVP states 
had never adopted SVP laws.  
Florida has failed to provide figures to the SHR system 
since 1996,75 and so we dropped it and designated the other 
nineteen SVP states as treatment states. We designated the 
thirty non-SVP states as the control group. Table 2 lists the 
treatment states and the date of SVP passage. 
 
 
Table 2. Treatment States by Date of SVP Passage 
Next, we decided which years to designate as being 
before and after treatment. We chose 1989 as our pre-
treatment year since it was prior to passage of all SVP 
legislation. We chose 2009 as our post-treatment year since it is 
the most recent year for which data is currently available.  
1. Sex-Related Homicide 
We then computed the mean rate of sex-related 
homicides in treated and control states, between 1989 and 
2009. As Table 3 below shows, the mean rate of sex-related 
homicides dropped substantially in SVP states between 1989 
and 2009 and much less substantially in non-SVP states over 
the same period. This pattern leads to a superficial impression 
that SVP passage may have led to fewer sex killings. 
  
 75 See National Center for Juvenile Justice, Easy Access to the FBI’s 
Supplementary Homicide Reports: 1980 – 2010, Methods Section, Data Coverage (Accessed 
7/18/2013, Last updated: 8/8/2012) http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezashr/asp/methods.asp 
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Table 3. Mean Rate of Sex Homicides (per 100,000) in SVP and Non-
SVP States Between 1989 and 2009 
This inference, however, is not justified upon closer 
inspection of the data. Figure 2 gives the time series plot for sex 
killings since 1976, separately for SVP and non-SVP states and 
reveals three important patterns. First, sex killings have been in 
secular decline since at least the mid-1970s. Second, this trend is 
largely similar in both SVP and non-SVP states, which would not 
occur if SVP laws were having an effect on the incidence of sex 
killings. Third, 2008 and 2009 appear to be aberrant years for 
non-SVP states, in the sense that sex killings are unusually high 
in those years relative to 2006 and 2007, for example. In 
particular, a difference-in-differences estimate based on 1989 and 
2007 would have been consistent with no program effect, as 
opposed to a decrease of 0.055 in the rate of sex killing.  
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2. Forcible Rape 
We turn now to the same research design for forcible 
rape. For this measure, we have valid data for Florida, and so 
each of the fifty states is represented. Again using 1989 and 
2009 as reference years, we see that incidence of rape in SVP 
states falls by 4.7 rapes per 100,000 after passage, and that the 
incidence of rape in non-SVP states falls by 3.2 rapes per 
100,000. This implies a difference-in-differences estimate of 1.5 
fewer forcible rapes associated with SVP passage.  
 
 
Table 4. Mean Rate of Forcible Rapes (per 100,000) in SVP and Non-
SVP States Between 1989 and 2009 
As with our analysis of sex killings, however, a naïve 
difference-in-differences estimate is misleading in this context 
because the differences between SVP and non-SVP states in 
the prevalence of rape are not time-invariant. Figure 3 plots 
forcible rape in SVP and non-SVP states for the years 1960–
2009. These data indicate a high degree of fluctuation in the 
gap seen in the incidence of rape between SVP and non-SVP 
states prior to 1990. This empirical pattern falsifies the core 
assumption of a difference-in-differences design. 
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3. Child Sexual Abuse 
We turn now to the same research design for child sexual 
abuse. These data are available beginning in 1990, but for only a 
subset of the states, and the most recent year available is 
currently 2008. Table 5 shows the same difference-in-differences 
analysis, but with a beginning year of 1990 and an ending year of 
2008, for the states for which data is available. 
 
 
Table 5. Mean Rate of Child Sexual Abuse (per 100,000) in SVP and 
Non-SVP States Between 1990 and 2008 
Similar to our analysis of forcible rape, however, a naïve 
difference-in-differences estimate is misleading in this context 
because the differences between SVP and non-SVP states in 
the prevalence of child sexual abuse are not time-invariant. 
Figure 4 plots child sexual abuse rates in SVP and non-SVP 
states for 1990 to 2008. Data prior to SVP implementation are 
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not available. This is unfortunate, as data prior to program 
implementation are usually a key means of assessing the 
comparability of states that do and do not adopt SVP statutes. 
Nonetheless, this simple picture is useful for assessing the 
hypothesis that SVP passage leads to increased safety, as 
measured by the lack of child sexual abuse. Under a theory of 
increased safety, we should expect to see a widening gap 
between SVP and non-SVP states over time. First, more states 
have adopted SVP statutes over time. Further, within each 
state passing an SVP law, the program initially incapacitates a 
small number of persons relative to a mature SVP program.76 
Figure 4, however, does not indicate such a pattern and, 
indeed, is somewhat suggestive of the opposite pattern. 
 
Below, we subject the sex killing, forcible rape, and 
childhood sexual abuse data to the more rigorous research 
design of generalized difference-in-differences. That more 
sophisticated analysis confirms the first impression of Figures 
2, 3, and 4: namely, that there is little evidence SVP passage 
had a discernible effect on sex crimes. In light of the 
susceptibility of difference-in-differences to time-varying 
disparities between SVP and non-SVP states, we defer an 
analysis of gonorrhea rates until after we have described the 
generalized difference-in-differences approach. 
  
 76 Cf. fig.1, supra. 
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B. Panel Data Technique 
Now, we focus on the generalized difference-in-
differences technique first used by Louis Jacobson, Robert 
LaLonde, and Daniel Sullivan.77 Jacobson, LaLonde, and 
Sullivan estimated the magnitude and temporal pattern of the 
earnings lost by displaced Pennsylvania workers. One of us 
(McCrary) used the same model to estimate the effect of court-
ordered hiring quotas on the racial composition of municipal 
police departments.78 This technique is appropriate for 
estimating the impact of SVP laws for two main reasons. First, 
we have sex homicide and forcible rape data that spans a long 
period of time, from 1976 to 2008. Second, the laws themselves 
were passed in different states at different times. Both of these 
factors are necessary for a sound implementation of the 
generalized difference-in-differences methodology. A long time 
period is necessary because the technique implicitly estimates 
the effect of SVP passage, prior to its passage as well as 
subsequent to its passage by examining the level of the 
outcome—here, sex homicide and forcible rape—in the years 
leading up to and subsequent to passage. Consequently, data 
prior to the first passage date is desirable to obtain a robust 
estimate of the “effect” of SVP passage prior to its passage, just 
as data after the last passage date is desirable to obtain a 
robust estimate of the effect of SVP passage subsequent to its 
passage. Because the states passed the laws at different times, 
the methodology is able to distinguish the effects of secular 
changes—i.e., general national trends—in sex homicide and 
forcible rape from the effects of SVP passage in specific. 
The model can then standardize the date of SVP 
passage for all states to time 0. For example, Washington 
passed its SVP law in 1990 and California passed its SVP law 
in 1995. Thus, 1990 will be equivalent to Time 0 for 
Washington, and 1995 will be equivalent to time 0 for 
California. Time 1 will reflect data from 1991 in Washington 
and 1996 in California. Likewise, Time -1 will reflect data from 
1989 in Washington and 1995 in California. We will then run a 
series of regressions that estimate the difference in the rate of 
sexual homicide, forcible rape, and child sexual abuse after the 
  
 77 Louis S. Jacobson, Robert J. LaLonde & Daniel G. Sullivan, Earnings 
Losses of Displaced Workers, 83 AM. ECON. REV. Vol. 685, 693 (1993). 
 78 Justin McCrary, The Effect of Court-Ordered Hiring Quotas on the 
Composition and Quality of Police, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 318, 318-20 (2007). 
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passage of SVP legislation. One of the advantages of the 
generalized difference-in-differences methodology is that it 
legitimately enables us to make what is, at first blush, an 
apples-to-oranges comparison of different states passing SVP 
statutes in different years, but the methodology actually 
presents a reliable apples-to-apples comparison of the average 
experience of states in the first year after SVP passage, the 
second year after SVP passage, and so on. The methodology 
accomplishes this because different states are observed at 
different calendar times and event study times. For example, 
consider two states passing SVP statutes one year apart and 
suppose that SVP passage lowers the outcome. Compared to the 
later adopting state, the early adopting state should see declines 
in the outcome earlier. With many states and many different 
passage dates, these predictions become richer. The methodology 
can see whether the patterns in the outcome accord with these 
predictions and can choose the parameter estimates to best fit the 
cross-state and cross-time pattern of the outcome. 
1. Defining the Model 
This model allows an estimation of the impact that SVP 
laws have had on the rate of both sex-related homicide and 
forcible rape. 
The estimates correspond to least squares estimates of 
θj in the regression model, 
Yit = αi + βt + Σθj Ditj + εit, 
where the summation ranges over j, from -11 to 11, but 
omitting the term corresponding to j=0. Yit denotes the rate of 
sex killings or forcible rape in state i at time t, and Dit
j are leads 
and lags of SVP passage. There are 11 leads and 11 lags. For a 
< j < b, these are defined as Dit
j = Di1(t = Ti + j), where 1(A) 
equals 1 if A is true and is 0 otherwise. For j=a, we define Dit
j 
as Di1(t ≤ Ti + a), and for j=b, we define Ditj=Di1(t ≥ Ti + b), as 
this implies that the coefficients θj are measured in deviations 
from the date of passage.79 The variable Di shows whether the 
state ever passed SVP legislation. It is coded as a 1 for all SVP 
states and a zero for non-SVP states. Ti gives the year that the 
SVP legislation was passed. There are also dummy variables 
for each year (βt) and each state (αi). Intuitively speaking, this 
method allows for states to have different levels of the outcome 
  
 79 Id. at 330. 
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(these are the state fixed effects, or the αi), for each year to 
differ due to secular, or national, trends in the outcome (these 
are the year fixed effects, or the βt), and for the effects of SVP 
passage (these are the lead and lag coefficients, or the θj). 
Although the x-axis in the event study graph stretches 
from -10 to +10, the sample of states that drive the identification 
of θj changes. Although all of the SVP states have data that 
stretches back ten years before date of passage, only four 
states—Kansas, Minnesota, Washington and Wisconsin—have 
data that stretches forward ten years after date of passage.  
2. Sexual Homicide 
States like Washington and California enacted SVP 
legislation in response to high profile sex crimes. The public 
clamored for the government to protect them from dangerous 
sexual predators, and the government responded by passing 
SVP laws. Yet as Figure 5 shows, the rate of sex killings was 
actually quite flat prior to the enactment of SVP legislation. 
The interpretation of this figure is the same as that for Figure 
1, discussed above. The open circles are estimates of the θj 
parameters specified in the generalized difference-in-
differences methodology. The dashed lines represent 95 percent 
confidence intervals for the estimated θj parameters. These 
indicate the degree of uncertainty associated with the 
estimates because we have a sample of information, rather 
than the whole universe of possible information. In repeated 
instantiations of the sampling and measurement process, the 
true θj parameters would lie inside these confidence intervals 
95 percent of the time. As noted in the discussion of Figure 1, 
pre-passage estimates are a robustness check on the 
methodology and should be approximately zero if the date of 
SVP passage is random, while post-passage estimates are our 
best guess regarding the effect of SVP passage on the 
outcome—here, the rate of sex killings.  
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Figure 5 also shows the rate of sex killings after the 
passage of SVP legislation. In theory, the rate of sex killings 
could have dropped immediately, due to the increased 
deterrent of the specter of spending life in a locked mental 
hospital for a sex offense. It is of course also possible that sex 
killings are less influenced by policy than by urges and 
circumstances, in which case a deterrent effect might not have 
been expected. Sex killings, however, might have also been 
expected to decrease linearly due to SVP passage; this is, for 
example, the natural implication of Figure 2, which shows that 
commitments after SVP passage increased linearly.  
Interestingly, however, Figure 5 provides no discernible 
evidence that SVP passage led to either deterrence or 
incapacitation. Deterrence would manifest itself by a 
discontinuous shift down in the estimate immediately after 
passage, whereas incapacitation would manifest itself by a 
linear trend down following passage. Overall, the picture is 
consistent with no statistically important change. The dashed 
lines give twice standard error bands, which can be thought of 
as a 95 percent margin of error on the solid line. 
3. Forcible Rape 
Figure 6 shows the same analysis, but applied to the 
rate of forcible rape in SVP states before and after the passage 
of the sexually violent predator laws. Before the passage of 
SVP laws, the forcible rape rate is relatively flat. After the 
passage of SVP laws, the rate appears to drop from year 1 to 
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year 3, and then remains flat or declines slightly. The decline is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero, since zero is within 
the margin of error. As with the analysis of sex killings, the 
data indicate that SVP laws have had no discernible deterrent 
or incapacitation effects on the rate of forcible rape.  
 
4. Childhood Sexual Abuse 
Figure 7 shows the same analysis, but applied to the 
rate of childhood sexual abuse in SVP states before and after 
the passage of SVP laws. Before the passage of SVP laws, the 
rate of childhood sexual abuse is relatively flat. After the 
passage of SVP laws, the rate also appears flat, but bounces 
above and below zero more often. These changes, however, 
appear to have little structure to them. The data do not appear 
to be consistent with either a discontinuous shift down in the 
rate, nor with a shift downwards in the trend. Thus, as with 
the analysis of sex killings, the data indicate that SVP laws 
have had no discernible deterrent or incapacitation effect on 
the rate of child sexual abuse.  
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C. Corroboration: Event Study Estimates of the Impact of 
SVP Law on Gonorrhea Rate 
To corroborate these findings, we additionally examine, in 
Figures 8 and 9, the patterns in the prevalence of gonorrhea 
leading up to and subsequent to SVP law passage. Both figures 
indicate that SVP laws have had no discernible impact on the 
prevalence of sexual abuse.  
As with previous findings, Figure 8 shows that SVP and 
non-SVP states are generally different in terms of risk factors for 
the types of crimes SVPs are thought to be at risk of committing. 
In particular, SVP states have lower rates of forcible rape, child 
sexual abuse, and gonorrhea, albeit similar—but low—rates of 
sex killing.  
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Figure 9 also reinforces the conclusions from the 
preceding analysis. An incapacitation effect of SVP statutes on 
child sexual abuse would be expected to lead to a break in the 
trend of the gonorrhea coefficients following passage, specifically 
a break in the negative direction. A deterrent effect of SVP 
statutes on child sexual abuse would be expected to lead to a 
drop in the gonorrhea coefficients immediately following 
passage. Figure 9 gives no indication of either pattern. We 
emphasize that only an incapacitation effect would be consistent 
with the constitutional argument justifying SVP statutes. 
 
D. Summary of Findings  
Undoubtedly, those confined under SVP programs are 
prevented from committing crimes that would have been 
committed had they not been imprisoned. But the social choice 
is not between SVP programs and no SVP programs, but rather 
between SVP programs and alternative programs that are 
underfunded or not funded because of SVP outlays.80  
We estimated two regression models to test the effect of 
SVP laws on sex crimes. First, we used a difference-in-
differences design to see whether the trends in sex-related 
homicide, rape, and child sexual abuse in states with this new 
legislation were different from the trends in states that did not 
use these incapacitation innovations. Second, we used an event 
  
 80 Part VII, infra, details some of these tradeoffs including a dearth of funds for 
testing rape kits and significant cuts in probation supervision and sex offender treatment. 
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study estimate to see whether there was any impact upon the 
rate of sex-related homicide, forcible rape, child sexual abuse, 
or gonorrhea post passage of SVP laws. Neither approach 
provides discernible evidence of preventive effects. Either there 
are no preventive benefits associated with these laws, or the 
benefits are too small to measure with these methods.  
Proponents of SVP laws might respond that our study 
failed to take into account the fact that some would-be-
offenders simply moved to non-SVP states to avoid the threat of 
lifetime incarceration for their crimes. If endogenous mobility 
were an operative phenomenon, however, we would have 
expected to see a decline in offense rates following SVP 
passage. As previously noted, we did not see such a decline.  
These results are especially significant considering the 
hundreds of millions of dollars that have been allocated to expand 
the prosecution of sex offenders across the country.81 Given the 
additional resources devoted to arresting and prosecuting sex 
offenders, it would make sense for the detection rate of sex crimes 
to be higher; yet even in an atmosphere of increased sensitivity to 
sex offenses, our analyses found no evidence that SVP laws had a 
preventive effect.  
V. RECIDIVISM AND AGE  
Although our findings may seem surprising, the results 
are to be expected when the advanced age of SVPs is taken into 
account. Studies show that, like other types of offenders, as sex 
offenders age, their recidivism rate drops. Our data indicate 
that the median age at admission for an SVP is roughly 43, 
  
 81  Garrine P. Laney, Violence Against Women Act: History and Federal 
Funding (Feb. 26, 2010), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1716&context=key_workplace. The STOP Program furthers a 
coordinated, multidisciplinary approach to improving the criminal justice system’s 
response to violent crimes against women. It does this by developing and strengthening 
effective law enforcement and prosecution and strengthening victim services. For 
instance, the program trains law enforcement, judges, court personnel, and prosecutors 
to more effectively identify and respond to violent crimes against women, including 
sexual assault. The 1994 Violence Against Women Act required each state to distribute 75 
percent of its S.T.O.P. Program funds in equal parts to: law enforcement, prosecution, and 
victim services. The use of the remaining 25 percent was discretionary, within parameters 
defined by the law. The 2000 Violence against Women Act modified this allocation to 
require that not less than 25% of STOP funds go to law enforcement, 25% to 
prosecution, 30% to victim services and 5% to state and local courts, leaving 15% 
discretionary. S.T.O.P. Annual Report 6 (2004), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ovw/ 
214639.pdf. For a breakdown in the millions of dollars given to S.T.O.P. from 1999–
2003, see id. tbl.2. For a breakdown of more recent budgets, see Laney, supra, at 10-19 
tbls.1 & 2.  
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which is to be expected since SVP laws are targeted exclusively 
at individuals about to be released from prison after serving 
time for a new conviction or a parole violation. Yet targeting an 
older population does not make much sense because as sex 
offenders age, they actually pose less risk to society. In 2002, 
Karl Hanson used data from ten follow-up studies of adult male 
sex offenders ages 18–70+ (with a combined sample of 4673) to 
study the relationship between age and sexual recidivism.82 He 
found that, “In the total sample, the recidivism rate declined 
steadily with age . . . [and t]he association was linear . . . .”83 
Other researchers have come to similar results.84  
Interestingly, advancing age seems to affect sex 
offenders at different rates. Hanson found that the recidivism 
rate of both incest offenders and rapists declined steadily over 
time, and neither type of offender released after age 60 
recidivated. Although the recidivism rate of extra-familial child 
molesters also declined steadily with age, the drop was much 
less dramatic until the offender reached age 49, when 
recidivism dropped dramatically.85 
The age effect exists even in high-risk offenders.86 In 
2007, Prentky and Lee looked at the age effect on a group of 
136 rapists and 115 child molesters who had been civilly 
  
 82 R. Karl Hanson, Recidivism and Age: Follow-Up Data from 4,673 Sexual 
Offenders, 17 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE 1046, 1048, 1056 (2002).  
 83 Id. at 1053. 
 84 See, e.g., Howard E. Babaree et al., Aging Versus Stable Enduring Traits 
as Explanatory Constructs in Sex Offender Recidivism: Partitioning Actuarial 
Prediction into Conceptually Meaningful Components, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 443, 
461-63 (2009) (showing age at release provided unique and significant predictive 
ability); Patrick Lussier & Jay Healey, Rediscovering Quetelet, Again: The “Aging” 
Offender and the Prediction of Reoffending in a Sample of Adult Sex Offenders, 26 
JUST. Q. 828-56 (2009) (arguing that risk assessors should adjust the risk of 
reoffending based on the offender’s age at release); Patrick Lussier et al., Criminal 
Trajectories of Adult Sex Offenders and the Age Effect: Examining the Dynamic Aspect 
of Offending in Adulthood, 20 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 147-68 (2010) (challenging the 
conception of sex offenders’ risk as high, stable, and linear); Michelle L. Meloy, The Sex 
Offender Next Door: An Analysis of Recidivism, Risk Factors, and Deterrence of Sex 
Offenders on Probation, 16 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 211, 222-23 (2005) (showing that 
results indicate that under the right set of conditions, probation is the most 
appropriate criminal sanction for some types of sex offenders); Richard Wollert et al., 
Recent Research (N = 9,305) Underscores the Importance of Using Age-Stratified 
Actuarial Tables in Sex Offender Risk Assessments, 22 SEX ABUSE 47 (2010) (arguing 
that “evaluators should report recidivism estimates from age-stratified tables when 
they are assessing sexual recidivism risk, particularly when evaluating the aging sex 
offender”). 
 85 See Hanson, supra note 82, at 1054. 
 86 See Robert A. Prentky & Austin Lee, Effect of Age-at-Release on Long Term 
Sexual Re-offense Rates in Civilly Committed Sexual Offenders, 19 SEXUAL ABUSE 43, 
44 (2007). 
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committed to a Massachusetts prison and were then followed 
for 25 years.87 They found that with rapists, recidivism dropped 
linearly as a function of age. With child molesters, however, 
they found that recidivism increased from age 20 to age 40 and 
then declined slightly at age 50 and significantly at age 60. As 
Prentky and Lee point out, their sample is statistically small, 
and it is comprised of offenders with a higher base rate of 
recidivism than that of the general prison population:  
Although this latter consideration might be regarded as a limitation 
in terms of generalizability, it may also be seen as a strength of the 
study. Presumably, using a higher risk sample is a more severe test 
of the age-crime hypothesis, providing confirmatory support for the 
rapists and “amplifying” or exaggerating the quadratic blip in 
Hanson’s (2002) data for child molesters.88 
VI. PREDICTION PROBLEMS 
It is possible that the reason we see no discernible 
impact on the incidence of sex crimes is that because, even if 
there is indeed a small group of dangerous sex offenders, the 
state simply does not have the ability to identify those who are 
risk of reoffending.  
In Kansas v. Hendricks, the Court merely assumed that 
the state would be able to distinguish SVPs, but this is actually a 
difficult task. Clinicians are not very good at predicting who will 
re-offend,89 and so the state uses actuarial instruments like the 
Static 99 at SVP commitment hearings. Even the best 
instruments are only about 70 percent accurate, which results in 
many false positives when used on a population that has a low 
base rate of reoffending. If the explanation for our results is due 
at least in part to the state’s inability to accurately predict who 
  
 87 Id. at 45, 50. 
 88 See id. at 58. 
 89 See generally, e.g., JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT 
BEHAVIOR (1981); R. Karl Hanson, What Do We Know About Sex Offender Risk 
Assessment, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 50, 54 (1998) (arguing the research is more 
useful for identifying high-risk offenders than for determining when they could be 
safely released into the community); Vernon L. Quinsey & Rudolf Ambtman, Variables 
Affecting Psychiatrists’ and Teachers’ Assessments of the Dangerousness of Mentally Ill 
Offenders, 47 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 353 (1979) (arguing that 
predictions of dangerousness are conservative and of low accuracy); Vernon L. Quinsey 
& Anne Maguire, Maximum Security Psychiatric Patients: Actuarial and Clinical 
Predictions of Dangerousness, 1 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE 143 (1986) (showing lack of 
relation between clinical judgment model and outcome of re-offense).  
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will reoffend, then this raises significant procedural due process 
issues, which we will not be exploring in this article.90 
VII. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF OUR FINDINGS  
We have shown that SVP laws had no discernible 
impact on the incidence of sexual homicide, forcible rape, child 
sexual abuse, or gonorrhea. In addition to the constitutional 
significance of these findings, they also have important public 
policy implications. Given the high price tag for implementing 
SVP laws, we believe states could more effectively fight sex 
crimes by allocating scarce resources elsewhere.  
In 2006, the total civil commitment budget across the 
country equaled $454.7 million dollars, with SVP states 
spending an average of $94,017 per year on each committed 
SVP.91 California’s 2006 civil commitment budget was the 
highest with a total of $147.3 million, and Texas—which 
provided only outpatient care—spent the least at $1.2 million.92 
Security and legal fees, including the cost for attorneys and 
experts, are often not included, which means the total cost of 
SVP programs is significantly higher than these figures 
represent.93 In the state of Washington, for instance, the legal 
fees per offender added up to $60,000 per year.94 
To pay for SVP programs, some states have taken 
measures such as reducing the number of probation officers, 
even though at least one study showed that felony sex 
offenders on probation have a lower recidivism rate than those 
not on probation.95 Others have cut funding for domestic violence 
and sexual violence prevention programs.96 Still others have 
  
 90 For a detailed analysis of this problem, see generally Lave, supra note 25. 
 91 See GOOKIN, supra note 7, at 5.  
 92 Id. at 5. 
 93 Id. at 1. 
 94 Id.  
 95 See Meloy, supra note 84, at 227.  
 96 See JANUS, supra note 9, at 115. Janus writes that in 2004, California 
“spent more than $78 million to lock up 535 predators, while providing no substantial 
sex offender treatment for the seventeen thousand sex offenders in its prisons . . . .” Id. 
Janus also writes that in 2004, “Minnesota spent $26 million to lock up 235 predators.” 
That same year, pecuniary problems forced the state to propose cutting 137 of its 778 
police officers and to actually eliminate 100 probation officers’ positions despite rising 
caseloads, and it cut its funding for domestic violence and sexual violence prevention 
programs by $3.6 million per year. Id. 
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slashed funding for sex offender treatment programs that have 
been shown to reduce recidivism by as much as 30 to 40 percent.97  
Perhaps most poignantly, the funds currently used to 
pay for SVP programs could be directed toward the thousands 
of rape kits that languish in police departments across the 
country.98 According to a 2009 Human Rights Watch report, in 
Los Angeles alone, there were at least 12,669 untested sexual 
assault response team kits (known as SART or rape kits).99 In 
order to test these kits, Los Angeles would need to hire 
additional staff in their DNA laboratory at a cost of $1.6 
million a year.100 Although the Los Angeles Police Department 
has made some progress in reducing the number of unanalyzed 
kits, the California budget crisis has led to mandatory work 
furloughs that have slowed down these efforts.101  
Not testing rape kits has serious consequences. Rape 
kits often contain DNA and other physical evidence that can be 
critical in identifying perpetrators—especially in cases where 
the assailant is a stranger. Indeed, researchers have found that 
prosecutors are more likely to file rape cases when there is 
physical evidence.102 New York City’s experience illustrates the 
crime-solving power of these kits. In 1999, the city decided to 
eradicate the backlog of 16,000 untested rape kits in police 
  
 97 Id. at 115, 126 (describing lack of funding for sex offender treatment 
programs in California and Massachusetts). Other researchers have also found that sex 
offenders who complete sex offender treatment have lower recidivism rates than those 
who do not. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. MARSHALL ET AL., COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL 
TREATMENT OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS 157-58 (1999); Margaret A. Alexander, Sexual 
Offender Treatment Efficacy Revisited, 11 SEXUAL ABUSE 101-16 (1999); Donna 
Mailloux et al., Dosage of Treatment to Sexual Offenders: Are We Overprescribing?, 47 INT’L 
J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 171-84 (2000); R. Karl Hanson et al., 
First Report of the Collaborative Outcome Data Project on the Effectiveness of Psychological 
Treatment for Sex Offenders, 14 SEXUAL ABUSE 169, (2002).  
 98 In 2004, Congress passed the Debbie Smith Act as part of the Justice for 
All Act, which was specifically created to provide federal funds so that state and local 
law enforcement could test untested rape kits. Despite its stated purpose, the Act lets 
states use the money to test any kind of DNA backlog, not just rape kits. Thus it is 
hard to know how much money has actually been used to test rape kits. Perhaps this is 
why the rape kits backlog continued to grow in Los Angeles despite millions of dollars 
in Debbie Smith funding. HUMAN RTS. WATCH, TESTING JUSTICE: THE RAPE KIT 
BACKLOG IN LOS ANGELES CITY AND COUNTY 21, 29 (2009). 
 99 See id. at 1. 
 100 Id. at 32-33. 
 101 Joel Rubin, LAPD Cuts Backlog of Untested DNA Cases in Half, L.A. TIMES: 
L.A. NOW BLOG (Oct. 5, 2009, 1:44 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/ 
10/lapd-cuts-backlog-of-untested-dna-cases-in-half-.html. 
 102 See Dawn Beichner & Cassia Spohn, Prosecutorial Charging Decisions in 
Sexual Assault Cases: Examining the Impact of a Specialized Prosecution Unit, 16 
CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 461, 491 (2005). 
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storage by 2003.103 As of January 2009, the tested kits had 
resulted in 2000 cold hits104 and an additional 200 active 
investigations, arrests, or prosecutions.105  
If New York’s results are predictive for Los Angeles, 
then testing L.A.’s kits should lead to approximately 1580 cold 
hits and an additional 158 active investigations, arrests, or 
prosecutions.106 Thus, instead of paying $166,000 per year to 
lock up ten SVPs, California could reallocate those $1.6 million 
to prosecute sixteen times as many rapists.107  
VIII. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF OUR FINDINGS 
We have shown that SVP laws have had no discernible 
effect on the incidence of sexual homicide, forcible rape, child 
sexual abuse, or gonorrhea. This finding is significant because 
it challenges the only constitutionally permissible justification 
for the laws: civil incapacitation of the dangerous mentally ill. 
Our findings can also be used to mount a substantive due 
process challenge to SVP laws. Since both types of challenge 
require the Court to look independently at empirical findings, 
we will begin by discussing judicial deference to legislative 
findings of fact. 
A. Judicial Deference to Legislative Findings of Fact 
Historically, the Court has been deferential to 
Congressional and state legislative findings.108 When 
constitutional rights are at stake, however, the Court should 
  
 103 See HUMAN RTS. WATCH, supra note 98, at 55. 
 104 A cold hit refers to when DNA evidence from a suspect-less rape case is 
linked to the DNA profile of a particular person. See S. REP. NO. 107-334, at 11 (2002), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-107srpt334/pdf/CRPT-107srpt334.pdf 
Although critical, a cold hit is just the first step in the investigatory process. For 
instance, law enforcement must get a confirmatory DNA sample from the suspect, and 
ideally, law enforcement will get the chance to interview the suspect. Id. 
 105 HUMAN RTS. WATCH, supra note 98, at 55. 
 106 12,669 / 16,000 = .79; .79 x 2,000 = 1,580; .79 x 200 = 158. 
 107 1.6 million / 166,000 = 9.64; 158 / 9.64 = 16.46. It costs $47,102 per year to 
imprison someone in California; thus, 3.5 for these rapists could be incarcerated for the 
price of one SVP. Legislative Analyst’s Office, Criminal Justice and Judiciary: How Much 
Does It Cost to Incarcerate an Inmate?: California’s Annual Costs to Incarcerate an Inmate in 
Prison, 2008–09, LAO.GOV, http://www.lao.ca.gov/laoapp/laomenus/sections/crim_justice/ 
6_cj_inmatecost.aspx?catid=3 (last visited Apr. 9, 2013) (166,000 / 47,102 = 3.52). 
 108 See Borgmann, supra note 32, at 6-7; Neal Devins, Congressional 
Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 
1169, 1178-81 (2001). 
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maintain a more detached and critical perspective,109 as it 
acknowledged: “Although we review congressional factfinding 
under a deferential standard, we do not in the circumstances 
here place dispositive weight on Congress’ findings. The Court 
retains an independent constitutional duty to review factual 
findings where constitutional rights are at stake.”110 The 
Supreme Court has recognized that constitutional rights are at 
stake in SVP commitment, stating, “[i]t is clear that commitment 
for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty 
that requires due process protection.”111 Consequently, the 
Court has a duty to independently review the finding that 
SVPs are extremely dangerous since that finding provides the 
factual groundwork for the legislation’s civil classification.112  
Although the Court has not always undertaken such a 
review when fundamental rights are at stake, it should 
certainly do so here.113 First, the people whose rights are being 
taken away are sex offenders, and they are one of the most 
loathed groups in the country. It would be political suicide for 
legislators to challenge commonly held beliefs about sex 
offenders, and so public choice theory tells us they will not 
tackle this issue.114 In factual disputes over highly contentious 
issues like this one, courts are in a better position than 
legislatures to demand claims be proven true instead of merely 
presumed true.115 Judges are less beholden to the populace 
because many have lifetime appointments, and they can slow 
proceedings down to allow the presentation of complicated and 
nuanced evidence.116  
Furthermore, there was no real factual finding 
regarding the dangerousness of so-called SVPs; that they were 
extremely dangerous was just assumed to be true. Thus, we are 
not asking the Court to reconsider evidence that was presented 
but deemed insufficient; instead, we are asking the Court to 
  
 109 But see Borgmann, supra note 32, at 78 (arguing that the Court does not 
always defer when it is supposed to or remain critical when it is supposed to). 
 110 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007). 
 111 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (citations omitted). 
 112 Caitlin E. Borgmann calls these “‘dispositive’ social facts,” and she 
describes them as “the plainly empirical as opposed to doctrinal issues that a decision 
maker must resolve before determining a law’s constitutionality.” Borgmann, supra 
note 32, at 5. 
 113 See id. at 21-28. 
 114 See generally 1 CHARLES K. ROWLEY, PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY (1993). 
 115 Devins, supra note 108, at 1185-87. 
 116 Id. at 1182-87; Borgmann, supra note 32, at 21-46. 
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consider evidence that was not even available at the time it 
decided Hendricks. This is exactly the kind of research that 
Chief Judge Posner requested fourteen years ago: “I would like 
to see the legal professoriat redirect its research and teaching 
efforts toward fuller participation in the enterprise of social 
science, and by doing this make social science a better aid to 
judges’ understanding of the social problems that get thrust at 
them in the form of constitutional issues.”117  
B. Legitimacy of Empirical Studies in Constitutional 
Analysis  
Our request of the Court is nothing new; there is 
precedent for using empirical studies to challenge the 
constitutionality of a particular law, even when it requires 
overturning legislative findings of fact.118 In a span of less than 
twenty-five years, the Court went from holding that execution of 
16- and 17-year-olds did not violate the Eighth Amendment 
ban on cruel and unusual punishment119 to holding that 
mandatory life without possibility of parole (LWOP) for 
juveniles who had been convicted of homicide did.120  
Scientific studies of the developing adolescent brain led 
the Court to overturn its own precedent as well as factual 
findings of various lower courts and legislatures. In 1989, the 
Court held in Stanford v. Kentucky that executing 16- and 17-
year-olds did not violate the Constitution.121 In his majority 
opinion, Justice Scalia was openly dismissive of the studies 
presented regarding the cognitive and emotional development 
of juveniles. As he explained, “The battle must be fought, then, 
on the field of the Eighth Amendment; and in that struggle 
socioscientific, ethicoscientific, or even purely scientific 
  
 117 Posner, supra note 2, at 12. 
 118 See e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (where 
the Court held that segregated public school education violated the Equal Protection 
Clause). In coming to this conclusion, the Court contradicted specific findings to the 
contrary by state legislatures and courts. Indeed, in Plessy v Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896), the Court had held that “separate but equal” did not violate equal protection. 
Key to the Court’s decision in Brown were psychological studies that showed the 
detrimental impact of segregated education on minority children. The Court held that these 
studies were relevant regardless of whether they had existed at the time Plessy was decided. 
“Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. 
Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. Any language in Plessy v. 
Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.” Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95. 
 119 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). 
 120 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012). 
 121 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
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evidence is not an available weapon.”122 Just sixteen years later, 
the Court pointed to “scientific and sociological studies” in 
striking down the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. 
Simmons.123 By 2010, the Court was specifically citing brain 
imaging in its decision that LWOP for juveniles not guilty of 
murder violated the Eighth Amendment,124 and brain studies also 
figured in the Court’s 2012 holding that mandatory LWOP for 
juveniles guilty of murder violated the Eighth Amendment.125  
The studies that ended up proving so influential to the 
Court were due in large part to advances in brain imaging 
technology which allowed scientists to observe that the adolescent 
brain was still developing until a person was in his or her mid-
20s, including in areas of the brain that governed impulse 
control, reasoning, and judgment.126 These findings contradicted 
conventional wisdom that the brain had finished developing in 
early childhood. It led advocates to contend that juveniles 
should not be punished in the same way as adults because 
their impulsivity made them less culpable and because they 
were likely to be able to learn from their mistakes.127 
  
 122 Id. at 378. 
 123 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 124 As the Court wrote in Graham v. Florida, 
No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court’s observations in Roper 
about the nature of juveniles. As petitioner’s amici point out, developments in 
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences 
between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in 
behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence. 
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).  
 125 In Miller v. Alabama, the Court pointed to the importance of studies on 
adolescent brain development in its jurisprudence on the juvenile death penalty. 132 S. 
Ct. 2455 (2012). It then quoted several amici briefs and concluded, “The evidence 
presented to us in these cases indicates that the science and social science supporting 
Roper’s and Graham’s conclusions have become even stronger.” Id. at 2464 n.5. 
 126 See Jay D. Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Death Penalty, 13 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 115, 119-22 (2007). 
 127 See, e.g., Mary Berkheiser, Developments in Criminal and Evidence Law: 
Death Is Not So Different After All: Graham v. Florida and the Court’s “Kids are 
Different” Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 36 VT. L. REV. 1 (2011) (discussing the 
Court’s changing jurisprudence towards children and arguing that under principles of 
penal proportionality, all adolescent punishment should be mitigated by the fact that 
juveniles lack the fully developed decision making capacity of adults); Jeffrey Fagan, 
Atkins, Adolescence, and the Maturity Heuristic: Rationales for a Categorical Exception 
for Juveniles from Capital Punishment, 33 N.M. L. REV. 207 (2003) (arguing that the 
Court’s rationale for outlawing execution of the mentally retarded on the grounds of 
diminished culpability should apply to juveniles as well); Barry C. Feld, Competence, 
Culpability, and Punishment: Implications of Atkins for Executing and Sentencing 
Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 463 (2003) (contending that the same psychological 
and developmental characteristics that render mentally retarded offenders less 
blameworthy than competent adult offenders also characterize the immaturity of 
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Now that we have discussed the Court’s authority and 
responsibility to review legislative findings of fact, we turn to the 
relevance of our findings to the constitutionality of SVP legislation. 
C. Double Jeopardy 
SVP laws allow the state to use civil law to lock people 
away in what constitutes the functional equivalent of 
punishment. Because SVP laws are specifically targeted at 
those who have served their maximum prison sentence, the 
classification of the law as civil or criminal is critical. The Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments bar the state from punishing a 
person twice for the same crime, and so if the law were 
criminal, it would constitute an impermissible second 
punishment. If the law is civil, however, the state may continue 
to detain these individuals because the prohibition on double 
jeopardy does not apply.  
On appeal, Leroy Hendricks challenged the civil 
classification of the Kansas SVP law. While acknowledging 
that “a civil label is not always dispositive,”128 the Court 
nonetheless stated that showing a statute establishes criminal 
proceedings constitutes a “heavy burden.”129 In its opinion, the 
Court stated, “we will reject the legislature’s manifest intent only 
where a party challenging the statute provides ‘the clearest proof’ 
that ‘the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or 
effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’”130  
The challenger rarely prevails in these sorts of cases,131 
and Hendricks was no exception. The Court accepted the 
  
judgment and reduced culpability of adolescents and should likewise prohibit their 
execution, and more broadly, that because the generic culpability of adolescents differs 
from that of responsible adults, penal proportionality requires formal, categorical 
recognition of youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing.  
 128 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (citation omitted). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 
248-49 (1980)). 
 131 See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (holding that Fifth 
Amendment protections did not apply to proceedings under the Illinois Sexually 
Dangerous Persons Act because, although they were similar to criminal proceedings in 
that they were accompanied by strict procedural safeguards, they were essentially civil 
in nature); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (holding that in rem civil 
forfeiture proceedings were civil and not criminal); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 
(1980) (holding that a civil penalty assessed for violations of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act was civil and insufficiently punitive to require Fifth Amendment 
protections). But see Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (holding that 
two federal statutes which stripped American citizenship from individuals evading 
military service were punitive in nature and thus unconstitutional because they 
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state’s classification of the law as civil in large part because the 
justices simply accepted as true the empirical claim that SVPs 
are “extremely dangerous.” The rationale could not be 
deterrence, the Court reasoned, because SVPs cannot be 
deterred. Nor could it be retributive because the only purpose for 
introducing the prior criminal history was to show the presence 
of a mental order or dangerousness. Here, the Court simply 
begged the question—their prior history is used to prove what 
they already believe to be true. Furthermore, the fact that 
Kansas’ civil commitment scheme involved an indefinite 
affirmative restraint did not alter the Court’s holding because 
the legislative findings justified it. As the Court saw it, “Far 
from any punitive objective, the confinement’s duration is 
instead linked to the stated purposes of the commitment, 
namely, to hold the person until his mental abnormality no 
longer causes him to be a threat to others.”132  
In analyzing whether the SVP law is really criminal, we 
took a different tack. Mindful of the inherent difficulties in 
trying to assess the actual motives of legislators at the time 
they pass a law,133 we assumed their stated motivation 
accurately reflected their intent. Instead, we looked at whether 
empirical evidence ruled out their rationale. Ironically, this 
was what the majority in Hendricks did when dismissing 
deterrence as a possible rationale; the difference is that they 
assumed certain empirical evidence to be true, and we did not. 
We asked what the world would look like if SVPs were as 
dangerous as the legislature claimed them to be and then saw 
whether that description proved to be accurate. In conducting 
this inquiry, we used information that was neither available at 
the time the law was enacted nor when the Court decided 
Hendricks.  
The Kansas legislature premised its SVP law on the fact 
that they were incapacitating “[a] small but extremely 
dangerous group . . . [whose] likelihood of engaging in repeat 
  
imposed punishment without providing the protections required by the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments); Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 
(1994) (holding that less deference is appropriate when a single judge declares a 
particular sanction to be civil and that serious contempt fines are criminal and 
constitutionally can not be imposed absent a jury trial). 
 132 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363. 
 133 “Judicial inquiries into Congressional motives are at best a hazardous 
matter, and when that inquiry seeks to go behind objective manifestations it becomes a 
dubious affair indeed.” Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960). 
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acts of predatory sexual violence is high.”134 If SVPs were as 
dangerous as the legislature described, we would expect that 
their civil commitment would have an impact on the incidence 
of violent sex crime. Yet we find that SVP laws have had no 
discernible impact. Our findings are significant because they 
challenge the legislature’s rationale for the law. If the state 
cannot justify its law on incapacitation grounds, then it must 
provide another reason for locking these individuals away 
indefinitely—under the constraints imposed by the Constitution. 
Arguing that they deserve additional custody to pay for their 
crimes is an unacceptable alternative. Sending a message to 
deter would-be offenders is also off the table. Both these 
reasons are punitive, and they violate double jeopardy. 
D. Substantive Due Process 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “civil 
commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant 
deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”135 
For this reason, the Constitution strictly limits civil 
commitment to individuals who are both mentally ill and 
dangerous.136 Although the Court held in Hendricks that the 
SVP law in Kansas did not violate substantive due process, 
that challenge was based on whether mental abnormality 
constituted mental illness.137 We believe that our findings can 
serve as the basis for a due process challenge on other grounds, 
namely that so-called SVPs are not sufficiently dangerous to 
justify indefinite, involuntary commitment.  
SVP laws clearly infringe upon a fundamental liberty 
interest. The Court has recognized that indefinite, involuntary 
civil commitment to a locked mental institution constitutes a 
“significant deprivation”138 and “massive curtailment”139 of 
liberty. Indeed, the Court began its analysis in Hendricks by 
recognizing that “freedom from physical restraint ‘has always 
  
 134 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 351 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. §59-21a01 (1994)). 
 135 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). The Court has also 
recognized that an individual will suffer significant adverse consequences if he is 
involuntarily committed to a mental institution. Id. at 425-26. 
 136 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77 (1992). 
 137 Hendricks argued that his Due Process rights were violated because a 
mental abnormality did not constitute mental illness. The Court disagreed stating that, “the 
term ‘mental illness’ is devoid of any talismanic significance.” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359. 
 138 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983)). 
 139 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980) (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 
U.S. 504, 509 (1972)). 
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been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause from arbitrary governmental action.’”140 The liberty 
interest at stake in SVP commitment involves both the freedom 
from bodily restraint141 and the freedom from indefinite, 
involuntary commitment in a mental institution.142 The loss of 
liberty goes beyond a freedom from confinement to include the 
stigma associated with such confinement, or as the Court put 
it, “adverse social consequences . . . that . . . can have a 
significant impact on the individual.”143  
Because SVP laws infringe on fundamental rights, they 
are subject to heightened scrutiny. In Reno v. Flores, the Court 
laid out how heightened scrutiny applies to a substantive due 
process claim: “[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ 
guarantee of ‘due process of law’ . . . include[s] a substantive 
component, which forbids the government to infringe certain 
‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is 
provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest.”144 Another articulation of the strict 
scrutiny standard requires that “the law . . . advance a compelling 
state interest by the least restrictive means available.”145 We 
recognize that although strict scrutiny is a demanding standard, 
it by no means implies a death knell for legislation.146  
Protecting people from dangerous sex offenders clearly 
constitutes a “compelling government interest,” but our 
findings show that locking up adjudicated SVPs is not 
“narrowly tailored” to meet this goal. The lack of an 
incapacitation effect means that we are indefinitely confining 
many people who are at low risk of committing a violent sexual 
offense if released. Our findings show that SVP legislation is 
neither “carefully limited”147 regarding the circumstances under 
  
 140 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356 (quoting Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80).  
 141 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80. 
 142 Id. at 82. 
 143 Vitek, 445 U.S. at 492. 
 144 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993). 
 145 Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984). 
 146 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (“[W]e 
wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’”); see 
also Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 808-09 (2006) (finding that courts 
do not always strike down statutes under strict scrutiny and sometimes strike down 
statutes under rational review). 
 147 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
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which detention is allowed, nor “sharply focused”148 on the 
problem of preventing violent sex crimes. Instead, we show 
that SVP legislation is just a “scattershot attempt”149 at 
addressing a serious problem that results from the indefinite 
commitment of many people who would not reoffend.  
Furthermore, our findings show that SVP laws do not 
comport with the level of dangerousness required to justify 
indefinite civil commitment. The state of Kansas had argued 
that it should not have to prove that a person had difficulty 
controlling his dangerous behavior in order to commit him as 
an SVP, but the Court held otherwise in Kansas v. Crane150:  
We do not agree with the State, however, insofar as it seeks to claim 
that the Constitution permits commitment of the type of dangerous 
sexual offender considered in Hendricks without any lack-of-control 
determination. Hendricks underscored the constitutional importance 
of distinguishing a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil 
commitment “from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more 
properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.” That 
distinction is necessary lest “civil commitment” become a 
“mechanism for retribution or general deterrence”—functions 
properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment.151  
Instead, the Court held that the demands of due process 
required the state to prove that the person has a “mental 
abnormality” or “personality disorder” that makes it “difficult, 
if not impossible, for the [dangerous] person to control his 
dangerous behavior.”152 The Court further described that “[t]he 
severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to 
distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious 
mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil 
commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist 
convicted in an ordinary criminal case.”153  
Our findings show that this threshold for dangerousness 
has not been met. If the state was successfully locking up only 
those who had a difficult if not impossible time refraining from 
committing violent sex crimes, then there should be an 
incapacitation effect. The lack of such an effect as demonstrated 
  
 148 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 81 (1992) (describing the pre-trial 
detention scheme which the Court upheld in Salerno, 481 U.S. 739). 
 149 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750. 
 150 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002). 
 151 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997)). 
 152 Id. at 411 (alteration in original) (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358). 
 153 Id. at 413. 
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by our data suggests that the state is locking up people who are 
equally or even less dangerous than the typical recidivist.  
CONCLUSION 
SVP laws are premised on incapacitating dangerous sex 
offenders who would be committing sexually violent crimes if 
they were released into the community after serving their 
prison terms. One way of testing this theory is to see whether 
the rates of sex killing, forcible rape, and child sexual abuse 
change after the passage of SVP laws. If the offenders truly are 
as dangerous as the law purports, we would expect sex crime 
rates to drop post-passage. 
In this article, we analyzed that theory from three 
different perspectives. First, we ran a difference-in-differences 
regression. We found that there is no statistically significant 
change in the incidence of sex homicide, forcible rape, or child 
sexual abuse post passage. We then ran a disparate impact 
analysis and once again found that SVP laws have had no 
noticeable effect on the rate of sex killing, forcible rape, or child 
sexual abuse. Finally, we analyzed whether SVP laws have had 
an impact on the incidence of gonorrhea, and we find that they 
have not. 
In a sense, the small number of committed SVPs stacks 
the deck against conventional tests of statistical significance on 
issues such as homicides resulting from sex crimes and even 
forcible rape. There are only a few thousand SVPs incarcerated 
in the United States as compared to over a million persons 
locked up in conventional prisons. There are, however, two 
reasons why a sustained analysis of the impact of this 
legislation on sex crime rates is an indispensable part of any 
comprehensive analysis of such laws. First, despite the small 
number of persons confined, the aggregate costs of this strategy 
are relatively substantial. As noted above, implementing these 
laws costs hundreds of millions of dollars per year, and this 
high cost has forced some states to reduce funding for law 
enforcement and violence prevention programs.154 Nowhere is 
this borne out more than in the untested rape kits. As the 
analysis above showed, instead of paying $166,000 a year per 
detainee to lock up ten SVPs, California could reallocate that 
$1.6 million to prosecute sixteen times as many rapists.  
  
 154 See supra Part VII. 
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Second, as difficult as the prospect of a visible 
preventive effect may be, it is the only constitutionally 
acceptable rationale for enacting SVP laws and confining those 
deemed to be SVPs for lengthy periods of time. The only other 
possible justification—that these individuals deserve to be 
punished because they did bad things—would violate the 
Constitution’s double jeopardy prohibition.155 Thus, prevention 
is not merely the most important objective of SVP strategy; it is 
the only legitimate objective.  
All of the empirical indicators developed in this article 
are consistent with the proposition that SVP laws do not 
demonstrably prevent sex killing, forcible rape, or child sexual 
abuse. Of course, there can be no formal proof of zero 
effectiveness in the real world. Yet in light of the considerable 
costs of these laws, both in terms of the opportunity costs to the 
states and the lost liberty to the individuals, states would be 
wise to consider suspending the laws unless and until they 
prove effective.  
More significantly, in light of the fact that our findings 
undermine the only constitutionally permissible justification 
for SVP laws, we believe that states and the federal 
government should either definitively demonstrate that there 
is an incapacitation effect from these laws or suspend them 
immediately. We recognize, however, that our findings may not 
be strong enough for a court to find that we have met the 
“heavy burden” in showing that SVP legislation should be 
considered criminal. For that reason, our substantive due 
process analysis gains enormous significance. Because SVP 
laws infringe on fundamental rights, they are subject to 
heightened scrutiny, and the burden is on the government to 
show that the infringement on liberty is narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling interest. Our findings show that SVP states 
are confining many individuals who are not dangerous, and are 
certainly no more dangerous than the typical recidivist. Thus, 
the government is clearly not able to meet its burden.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 155 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 374 (1984). 
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